I. THE OFFICIAL TAXONOMY
The official taxonomy comprises two distinctions. In the general sense, to have the virtue of justice is to be a lawful person. The just things this person is concerned with are the actions prescribed by law. Law in turn aims at the common benefit, and thereby at the happiness of the community. Hence general justice is the whole of virtue exercised toward others (1l29bll-1130a13).
In the special sense, to have the virtue of justice is to be equal or fair. The just things the fair person is concerned with are equal or fair assignments or transfers of "honor or wealth or safety, or whatever single name will include all these" (l130b2f.). ('Fair' and 'equal' herein each translate the same Greek term, which encompasses also equal proportion to relevant merit.) Hence special justice is but one of the many virtues (1130a14-b18), or two of them, aiming at the just in rectification and in distribution. Justice in rectification is concerned with penalties in court and perhaps fair returns in trade (1 130b34-1 131 a9). Just rectification is a second transfer equal to the first, restoring equality between the parties (1131 b25-1132b20).
Distributive justice distributes goods in equal proportion to relevant merit. It is concerned with "honors or wealth or anything that can be divided among members of a community who share in a constitution" (1 130b31f.). Aristotle seems to think of political constitutions as the paradigmatic cases of the distributively just (l131a25-29), though in Chapter 2 he offers a kind of adultery as an activity distinctive of special and presumably distributive injustice (1 130a24-32 ).
II. A READING OF THE TAXONOMY
Our discussion focuses on the relation between distributive and general justice. The official taxonomy says these virtues differ because while the one makes fair distributions, the other performs lawful actions, and the law in turn aims at the common benefit. "And so in one way what we call just is whatever produces and maintains happiness and its parts for a political community" (l129b 17 -19). Hence we might say that the lawful person aims indirectly at the common benefit, and thereby at the happiness of the community, even if she is guided mainly by her idea of what the law asks rather than her own idea of what would be most beneficial. As Aristotle points out in Book I, one aim can be for the sake of another and another, and we may only dimly grasp our farther aims (1094aI8-26).
Each of the several virtues, so far as it is exercised toward others, must then aim at the common benefit, at least indirectly. For example, distributive justice supports the common benefit; for as Aristotle says elsewhere, to distribute the external goods in proportion to merit -roughly, rule to virtue and property to need -is to place each where it will best support the common benefit (EN 1 137a26-30; Pol. 1287a14-18, 1323b40-1324a2) .
The distinction between direct and indirect aims suggests a further thought about the taxonomy. Aristotle says in presenting his taxonomy that the different justices do or wish what is differently just (1129a6-9 and ENV. 1-3 passim). His point may be, not that the justices differ in their aims, but only that they differ in their direct aims. The direct aim of distributive justice is the fair, and the direct aim of general justice is the lawful.
This interpretation would in principle allow Aristotle to hold further that in a way, the whole aim and standard of general justice is fair distribution (and thereby the common benefit).l He could hold that while distributive justice aims
